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This discussion paper presents model results and discussion of their context and 
interpretation to address effects of agricultural trade liberalization by developed and 
developing countries. The exercise originated as part of the extensive modeling efforts 
undertaken by the three lead authors in the former Trade and Macroeconomics Division 
of IFPRI. A short synopsis of the results was prepared in August 2003 to inform the 
public debate prior to the September ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico for the Doha 
Development Round of negotiations under the World Trade Organization. This is a more 
comprehensive version of the same paper.   
Many additional modeling efforts have subsequently been undertaken, including 
by the authors, to shed further light on the impacts of agricultural trade liberalization. 
This earlier paper, however, continues to lay out in a clear way a number of the key 
model dimensions that influence empirical assessments of agricultural subsidy and trade 
policy effects. We thank the many participants in discussions of these results for their 
comments and look forward to further policy debate in this area as the Doha Round 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper accomplishes two objectives. First, it provides simulation results from 
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that have helped focus the debate about 
the potential effects of agricultural trade liberalization on developing countries. The 
aggregate numbers show modest net positive effects over a medium-term period (five 
years out). First, when developed countries fully remove their subsidies and trade 
barriers, welfare and GDP of the developing countries rise, as do value added in 
agricultural production and agro-industries, and agricultural exports. Focal point 
estimates that we provide are increases in welfare and GDP of $10 billion and $15 
billion, respectively, while agricultural value added increases $23 billion and agricultural 
exports by $37 billion. Second, when developing countries also eliminate their subsidies 
and trade barriers, there is an additional net gain in aggregated developing country 
welfare and GDP—which now increase by nearly $20 billion and $38 billion. Thus, 
developing countries gain from developed country liberalization, but there are also gains 
from reform of their own policies. Our results suggest a fairly even balance between 
these sources of gains. 
The second and equally important contribution of the paper is to describe the 
heterogeneity among developing countries in terms of their agricultural resources, and to 
disaggregate the simulated results among 40 developing countries or regions. The basic 
model includes the innovation of assuming there is unemployed labor in developing 
countries, so growth in agricultural production has a modest “multiplier” effect. The basic 
model also allows for a slight positive effect of increased trade on productivity—the focal   iii
results cited above include this impact. Effects are distinguished between elimination of 
subsidies and trade barriers by the US, the EU, Japan and Korea, and all developed 
countries simultaneously. Effects on different developing countries and regions differ due 
to differences in the subsidy and trade barrier instruments utilized by the developed 
countries, the commodities affected, and the trade patterns and volumes evident in the 
initial baseline data. 
Disaggregation of the impacts among developing countries also demonstrates that 
while most gain and become more food secure, there are some developing countries that 
are disadvantaged by agricultural trade liberalization by developed countries. Results are 
presented with and without the change in productivity. Not surprisingly, rising 
productivity offsets the negative effects measured with constant productivity in some 
cases. Reform of developing country’s own agricultural trade policies also lead to net 
welfare gains, although not always to increased value added in agriculture which is a 
measure we report because it is closely tied to rural well being.    iv
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TELL ME WHERE IT HURTS, AN’ I’LL TELL YOU WHO TO CALL
1:  
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES’ AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Xinshen Diao, Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, Sherman Robinson and David Orden
2  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Different studies before and during the Uruguay Round, as well as projections of 
possible scenarios for the current negotiations, have tried to quantify the impact of the 
agricultural policies of industrialized countries on the world economy, and developing 
countries in particular. Those studies usually estimated that an eventual reduction of 
agricultural protection and subsidies in industrialized countries would produce positive 
effects on welfare, production and exports of agricultural products of developing 
countries as a whole (Valdés and Zietz, 1980; Goldin and Knudsen, 1990; Sharma, 
Konandreas, and Greenfield, 1996;  Goldin and van-der-Mensbrugghe, 1995; ABARE, 
2000; Hertel, et al 2000; USDA/ERS, 2001). But some of the studies also raised the 
possibility of negative welfare effects for a subset of developing countries due to adverse 
changes in the terms of trade. The combination of domestic support, market protection 
and export subsidies by industrialized countries depressed world prices and reduced 
market opportunities for a variety of food products.  This hurt developing countries that 
were net exporters but it was also argued that such outcome may have helped developing 
                                                 
1 Bob Dylan, Quinn The Eskimo, The Mighty Quinn, 1968. 
2 The authors are Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Executive 
Director, Inter-American Development Bank, Professor, Sussex University, and Senior Research Fellow, 
IFPRI. At the time this paper was written, the first three authors were employed at IFPRI. The August 2003 
short version of the paper is “How Much Does it Hurt: The Impact of Agricultural Trade Policies on 
Developing Countries” by Xinshen Diao, Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla and Sherman Robinson. A related paper is 
“Making Agricultural Trade Liberalization Work for the Poor” by Joachim von Braun, Ashok Gulati and 
David Orden (2004).        2
countries that were net importers of those products (Koester and Bale, 1990; see the 
review in Sharma, Konandreas, and Greenfield, 1996).   
Many of the studies presented aggregate results for groups of developing 
countries. With the advance of current Doha Round negotiations and larger participation 
of developing countries in the negotiations, there has been more interest in analyzing the 
disaggregated policy impacts on individual countries.  Two recent studies by Vanzetti 
and Graham (2002), and Poonyth and Sharma, (2003), using world commodity (multi-
market) models with 161 countries/regions (the European Union counted as one), 
calculate that a non-trivial number of developing countries, ranging from 2/3 to 3/4 of the 
total, may suffer welfare losses from the scenarios of agricultural liberalization in 
industrialized countries considered in their simulations.
3  In a general equilibrium setting 
Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney, 2003, also found that several developing countries may 
suffer welfare losses in some scenarios, particularly when only domestic support is 
reduced without changes in market access.
4  Another way of reading the results is that 
domestic support – but not market protection –  in industrialized countries may increase 
welfare in several developing countries.   
Another result that appeared in much of the simulations mentioned and that has 
been replicated in more recent studies (World Bank, 2001, Tokarick, 2003) is that 
                                                 
3 Vanzetti and Graham 2002 simulate a repetition of the cuts agreed during the Uruguay Round, leading to 
an additional 20% cut in domestic support, a 21% reduction in exports subsidies, and a 36% cut in out-of-
quota tariffs. Poonyth and Sharma, 2003 analyze three alternatives of agricultural trade liberalization based 
on the proposals presented during the WTO negotiations by the US, the EU, and the attempted synthesis 
proposal presented during March 2003 by the then President of the Committee on Agriculture, Stuart 
Harbinson.   
4The relevant simulations are first a 50% cut in domestic support and, second, 50% reductions in tariffs and 
export subsidies with domestic support in industrialized countries changed to less trade distorting methods.     3
developing countries appear to benefit far more from their own agricultural liberalization 
than from liberalization in industrialized countries.  The implications for developing 
countries in the current agricultural negotiations of the double finding that several of 
them may be hurt by industrialized countries’ agricultural liberalization while they would 
benefit most from their own liberalization, seem the opposite to the approach followed by 
most of those countries so far which have insisted in reducing protection and subsidies in 
industrialized countries, while trying to maintain their own legal latitude to maintain their 
protection (see Diaz Bonilla, Diao, Robinson, 2003).
5   
This paper takes another look at these issues in a world general equilibrium 
model.  In particular, it analyzes again the impact of industrialized countries’ policies on 
developing countries but disaggregates the results along two dimensions:  first, it 
differentiates the source of policy changes by industrialized country/region, and second, 
it utilizes the full disaggregation of developing countries available in the GTAP (version 
5) data base (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002).  The paper also considers agricultural 
liberalization in both developed and developing countries to assess the relative 
importance of each scenario.
6   
A main difference with earlier studies is that the model is run with unemployment 
in developing countries (as opposed to the full employment specification of many general 
                                                 
5 Of course industrialized countries also benefit from their own liberalization.  
6 To the extent that the simulations only include changes in agricultural policies, we are still in the murky 
world of second-best welfare comparisons (see R.G. Lipsey and R.K. Lancaster, 1956) with possibly 
different results if other scenarios of liberalization were considered (for instance, agriculture plus industry, 
or both plus services; see the sequential scenarios in Hertel, T. W., K. Anderson, J. F. Francois, and W. 
Martin. 2000).  The simulation of more complex scenarios across all sectors would be appropriate to assess 
the impact of the Doha negotiations as a whole. In this paper, however, the question is only a limited 
counterfactual analysis regarding the impact of industrialized countries’ agricultural policies on developing 
countries, given the rest of the policies for the other sectors.   4
equilibrium models), and in some simulations, a modest productivity effect is 
considered.
7  With that specification the paper finds that agricultural liberalization in 
industrialized countries has larger and more uniformly positive results on developing 
countries, and the relative importance of own liberalization versus liberalization in 
industrialized countries for welfare increases in developing countries is more balanced.  
The implications for the negotiations are that developing countries seem correct in asking 
the liberalization of agriculture in industrialized countries, but at the same time those 
countries must also consider the important potential gains from their own agricultural 
sector liberalization.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  First, the variety of situations 
among developing countries is discussed. Second, the heterogeneity of the agricultural 
sectors and policies in industrialized countries is also recognized and briefly analyzed.  
Both aspects are important, given the fact that agricultural policies of industrialized 
countries, and their possible changes, will have different effects depending on the specific 
characteristics of individual developing countries. Third, the paper discusses the model 
and the simulations.  Finally, some conclusions close the paper.  
                                                 
7 The multimarket models have not incorporated technical change and by their own partial-equilibrium 
nature do not consider the possible multiplier effects and links to the rest of the economy, including, of 
course, the possible additional economic expansion caused by labor utilization of previously unemployed 
workers (see the discussion in the text below).     5
2.  HETEROGENEITY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Developing countries and regions show a great variety of growth patterns and 
structural characteristics.  Table 1 presents some structural indicators.  Agriculture in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is less important as a percentage of the GDP, 
and rural population is smaller when compared to total population, than in other regions.  
Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia fall on the other extreme, with agriculture 
production and rural population having larger incidence in those regions.  At the same 
time LAC depends more on agricultural exports, and agriculture appears more productive 
(per unit of labor), uses more capital (proxied by tractors) and, after South Asia, is the 
region better served by roads (the large Amazon area in LAC affects the value of this 
indicator).  Africa and LAC have more available arable land per capita than Asian 
developing countries, but average holdings are far larger in LAC and land appears to be 
distributed more unequally in Latin America and the Caribbean than Asia, with Africa in 
between (Table 2).  It is important to notice that SSA has an availability of land that is 
comparable to LAC, but at the same time average holdings are of similar sizes as those in 
Asia, and the region shows the lowest values for the capital/technology and roads 
indicators, highlighting some of the opportunities and constraints to expanding 
agricultural production in that region.   
Agricultural production per-capita has been increasing in all developing regions, 
except for Africa and particularly Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Table 3), where poor 
production performance has been associated with macroeconomic imbalances, war and 
civil conflict, and the high incidence of disease in rural areas.    6






















Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)   7.9  17.9  13.9  28.3  15.4  13.2  36.7 
Rural population (% of total population)   26.5 68.4  43.6 73.2  67.7 60.6  76.4 
Agriculture value added per worker 
(constant 1995 US$)  
  2915.5  349.2  2163.6  376.2  418.4  589.8  239.0 
Agricultural exports  
(% merchandise trade)  
28.3 23.9 4.7 17.9  11.7 15.3  35.3 
Land use, arable land 
(hectares per person)  
0.27 0.26  0.21 0.16  0.11  0.21  0.20 
Agricultural machinery, tractors per 100 
hectares of arable land  
118.2 18.0  117.8  80.9 67.9 102.0  8.0 
Roads, km per squared km of total area  0.141  0.052  0.062  0.551  0.139  0.123  0.044 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD 2002. 
 
Table 2—Land Structure: Average Size of Holdings and Concentration 
 





Africa a/  2.92  1.20  0.53 
Asia Developing b/  2.20  1.62  0.57 
LAC w/Argentina c/  87.09  63.25  0.82 
LAC w/o Argentina  32.53  27.66  0.82 
USA 186.95  na  0.64 
EU d/  27.27  17.91  0.59 
Japan/Korea 1.12  1.15  0.47 
Canada 349.07  na  0.74 
 
 
Source: FAO, 2001. 
a/ Burkina Faso, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea,  Bissau, Lesotho, Libya,  
    Malawi, Namibia, Reunion, Uganda. 
b/ India, Indonesia, Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam. 
c/  Honduras, Panama, Puerto Rico, Argentina, brazil, Columbia, Paraguay, Peru. 
d/ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,    
    Portugal, Spain, Malawi, Namibia, Reunion, Uganda.  7
Table 3—Agricultural Production per capita (indices: base 1989-91) 
  
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
China 58.65  64.06  87.57  134.09 
Asia Developing less China  82.44  84.71  94.95  105.12 
Africa Developing  108.84  103.23  96.10  102.10 
SSA 115.74  108.28  98.32  101.09 
LAC 84.69  89.94  98.00  108.22 
Developing Countries  77.78  81.38  93.72  113.11 
World 86.98  91.46  97.82  103.86 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
The composition of agrifood exports from developing countries has changed 
during the last four decades (Table 4), notably with the emergence of fruits and 
vegetables, and oilseeds and products, as the more dynamic export products.  These two 
categories jumped from about 20 percent of total agricultural exports in the 1960s, to 
slightly more than 35 percent during the 1990s. They displaced traditional export crops 
such as sugar and coffee-cacao-tea, which declined from about 35 to 40 percent of 
agricultural exports during the 1960s-1980s to about 25 percent during the 1990s.  
Although cereals exports constitute nearly 10 percent of total exports, developing 
countries, as a group, are net importers of cereals.  
Table 4—Structure of Exports: All Developing Countries 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals and Prep   9.12  9.21  8.72  7.57  9.31  6.58  8.22  9.42 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp.    22.94  23.84  20.16  28.29  22.29  20.42  13.91  15.22 
Fruit + Vegetables   9.43  12.21  11.52  12.18  14.59  18.15  20.35  19.26 
Meat and Meat Prep   3.53  4.78  4.96  3.98  4.42  4.72  6.00  5.46 
Natural Rubber   7.14  5.81  4.95  5.43  4.38  4.54  4.18  3.64 
Oilseed & Products    10.40  9.55  11.21  12.26  14.11  13.97  15.61  16.65 
Sugar and Honey     10.79  9.58  16.85  12.73  12.26  9.65  6.71  6.24 
Textile Fibres     14.74     13.23  10.63  7.27  6.56  6.72  4.29  3.29 
Tobacco 3.13  2.73 3.01  2.78  3.37 3.88 6.58 6.36 
Other 8.78  9.04  7.98  7.52  8.70  11.36  14.15  14.47 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: FAOSTAT   8
Within that general structure, there are important regional differences across 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) (see Diaz-Bonilla, Thomas, 
Robinson, and Yanoma 2002, for a more detailed analysis and supporting tables). African 
agricultural exports are still dominated by coffee-tea-cocoa, and have a larger incidence 
(about 10%) of textile fibers in total exports.  Compared to other regions, Asia has a 
larger incidence of cereal exports, with about 13% of total exports. While all three 
regions are net exporters of fruits and vegetables, and coffee-tea-cocoa, LAC has a 
stronger net export position than the other regions in those products. Of the three regions, 
LAC has the larger incidence of meat exports (around 6% of total). 
The combined import shares of cereals, oilseeds, dairy, and meat products 
together ranged between 50 to 57 percent of total agricultural imports during the 1960s to 
1990s (Table 5). In the 1960s and 1970s, developing country imports of cereals 
represented almost 40 percent of their total agricultural imports, but those import shares 
slowly decreased to below 24 percent.  Dairy products, on the other hand, maintained 
their share between 6 and 7 percent. Imports of oilseed and products have been increasing 
over time, and have reached 16 percent of total agricultural imports in the second half of 
the 1990s, but also have a slightly larger share in agricultural exports. On the import side 
there are also differences in structure across regions.  Although all the regions are net 
importers of cereals and dairy products, Africa shows the larger incidence of imports of 
those products.  In LAC, net imports of cereals and dairy are more than compensated by 
net trade surpluses in other agricultural products. Asia developing countries oscillate 
around positive and negative balances in agricultural trade.  Overall, agricultural exports   9
and imports have also become more diversified in the regional groups (see Diaz Bonilla, 
Thomas, Robinson, and Yanoma, 2002).  
Table 5—Structure of Imports: All Developing Countries 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
Except for rice, for which a few Asian countries’ exports account for 70% of 
world rice trade, the North, especially the U.S. and Canada, dominates world grain 
exports.  Exports of non-grain crops, such as vegetables and fruits, cotton, sugar, and 
vegetable oil, are largely the domain of developing countries.  Excluding intra-EU trade, 
developing countries account for 60% to 80% of world exports of these commodities, 
most of which are exported to the North.  Due to such different export structures, the 
pattern of competition of exports and imports between developed and developing 
countries is complex and varies across countries and regions: some categories of 
agricultural exports (but not all) of developing countries may not compete directly with 
the exports of developed countries, but exports of industrialized countries compete with 
grain and animal products in the domestic market of developing countries.  As discussed 
below, changes in those policies may have, at least in the short run, differentiated effects 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals and Prep   38.28  38.19  39.15  32.48  32.43  26.08  23.70  23.96 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 5.49 5.57 3.92  4.78 4.09 4.12 3.62  3.39 
Dairy Products+Eggs  6.61  6.65  6.27  6.97  7.60  7.47  6.73  6.02 
Fruit + Vegetables   7.65  8.47  7.34  8.21  8.26  8.83  9.59  9.38 
Meat and Meat Prep   3.01  3.46  3.49  5.10  6.12  5.97  5.93  5.92 
Natural Rubber   2.33  2.10  1.60  1.62  1.20  1.71  1.41  1.36 
Oilseeds&products  5.97  6.12  7.73 10.12 11.03 11.39 12.48 16.05 
Sugar and Honey   7.15  4.85  8.74  7.32  6.38  5.73  5.39  5.23 
Textile Fibres   8.30  7.62  7.11  6.91  5.70  7.44  7.24  6.20 
Tobacco 3.09  3.16 2.54  3.16 3.31 4.39 5.76 5.26 
Other    12.13  13.81  12.10  13.33  13.87  16.87  18.16  17.23 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00  100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00   10
on overall welfare, on one hand, and production, on the other, in developing countries 
due to the different effects on consumers and producers. The different positions taken by 
developing countries in the Doha Round negotiations have reflected this heterogeneity 
(Diaz-Bonilla, Diao, and Robinsons, 2003).  
Developing countries export their larger share of agricultural exports to developed 
countries. But the shares differ by developing region (Table 6). Africa exports mostly to 
the EU and other African countries (57% and 14%, respectively).  The export partners of 
Latin American developing countries are mostly the EU (34%) and US/Canada (26%), 
followed by LAC countries (18%), but with large differences from north to south in the 
Continent.
8  Developing countries in Asia, on the other hand, sell mostly to other 
developing countries in the region (37%), and only after that to Japan (20%) and the EU 
(17%).  This diverse trade pattern implies that changes in trade and agricultural policies 
in industrialized countries will have very different impacts on developing countries. In 
particular, for Asia it may matter more what other developing countries in the region do.    
McCalla and Valdes (1999) provide further evidence of heterogeneity by looking 
at individual countries: among 148 developing countries they identify 105 countries that 
are net food importers and 43 that are net food exporters (15 from the low income group). 
In total agriculture, 85 are identified as net importers and 63 as net exporters (33 from the 
low income group). Among the most vulnerable economic groups, over one third of UN-
defined Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are net agricultural exporters, more than half 
of the low-income food deficit countries (LIFDC) are net agricultural exporters. 
                                                 
8 For instance 70% of Mexico’s agricultural exports are oriented to US/Canada, while for Argentina and 
Uruguay only about a third of their exports go to developed countries.   11
 























Africa 70.7  5.4  57.0  3.5  0.3  4.5  29.3  14.3  9.2  1.4 3.3  1.0 
Asia 51.3  8.7  16.8  19.8  1.5  4.4  48.7  4.0  36.9  1.1 6.2  0.5 
LAC 68.3  25.8  34.0  3.2  0.3  5.0  31.7  3.3  6.4  17.6 3.7  0.7 
Middle East  48.2  4.2  36.2  1.6  0.3  5.9  51.8  4.7  6.3  1.0 37.2  2.7 
Total 4 developing regions   60.7  14.9  30.2  10.0  0.8  4.7  39.3  5.2  19.2  7.8 6.3  0.8 
Source: Calculated from WTO 2001.   12
Similarly, Diaz-Bonilla, Thomas, Robinson, and Cattaneo (2000) using cluster 
analysis across a world sample of developed and developing countries, show the 
heterogeneity of food security conditions among developing countries.  This study 
classifies 167 countries encompassing all levels of income into 12 clusters using five 
indicators of food security: food production per capita, the ratio of total exports to food 
imports, calories per capita, protein per capita, and the share of the non-agricultural 
population share.  Developing countries appear scattered across all levels of food security 
and insecurity, except in the very high food-secure group. Among food-insecure 
countries, the profiles also differ: some are predominantly rural (mostly in Africa and 
South Asia) whereas for others the urban population is more important (like many 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and in transition economies).   Obviously 
the same policy (such as maintaining high prices for producers) will have different 
impacts in these two types of countries. Also some countries are food insecure mostly 
because of low levels of calories and proteins per capita, although they do not use large 
percentages of their exports to buy food. In the terminology of Diaz-Bonilla, Thomas, 
Robinson, and Cattaneo (2000), these countries are “consumption vulnerable” but not 
“trade stressed.”  Other food-insecure countries are a mirror image: they appear trade 
stressed (using a large percentage of their exports to buy food) but less consumption 
vulnerable (their current levels of calories and proteins per capita are close to the average 
for all countries considered). Again, the policy options for these two types of countries 
are different, to the extent that the first group may increase imports to improve 
availability of calories and proteins, whereas the second group appears more constrained.   13
The analysis also suggests that some of the country categories utilized by the WTO may 
not be adequate to capture food security concerns, particularly the Net Food Importing 
Developing Countries, group that is split about 60%-40% between food insecure and 
food neutral groups. LDCs, on the other hand, include mostly countries suffering from 
food insecurity, but some countries that appear in food insecure categories, are neither 
LDCs nor NFIDCs.   
3.  DIFFERENCES ACROSS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Industrialized countries are also very different in terms of their agricultural 
sectors and policies.  Table 2 already showed the differences in average farm size and 
land concentration.   Japan and Korea show mostly small farms with a more egalitarian 
land distribution, while the USA and Canada have larger average holding and more 
unequal land structure, and the European Union is somewhere in between.   
The share in world agricultural production (measured in 1989-1991 world prices) 
is about similar for the USA and the EU (15) at around 12-13% (Table 7).  The size of 
their agricultural sector is smaller than China’s but larger than India’s the other two large 
individual agricultural producers.  Looking at trade shares (Table 8), the USA has been 
losing market share in world exports while maintaining its import share.  On the other 
hand, the change in the net trade position in the European Union during the 1980s as a 
result of the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), has been one of the most 
dramatic developments in world agricultural markets: it significantly increased its export 
share, while reducing its participation in world imports.  The result has been that EU’s   14
net demand for agricultural products from the rest of the world (Chart 1), which 
amounted to about 30 billion dollars at the beginning of the 1980s (in current dollars), 
almost disappeared by the end of the 1990s.   
Both Japan and Korea have been increasing slowly their import shares (Table 8), 
and their net trade (Chart 1), while Canada appears to have maintained both export and 
import shares about stable.   
 
Table 7—Shares of World Agricultural Production 
 




China                              20.1 
India 9.5 
Cairns Group (of which)  16.5 
      Canada  1.4 
      Australia/New Zealand  2.2 
      Indonesia  2.0 
      Thailand  1.1 
      Philippines  0.8 
      Argentina  1.9 
      Brazil  4.5 
      South Africa  0.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa (of which)  4.9 
      Nigeria  1.2 
Subtotal 77.6 
Source: FAOSTAT 
Table 8—Shares of Exports and Imports, Developed Countries 
 
  Exports Imports 
 1960-1980 1981-1994 1995-2001 1960-1980 1981-1994 1995-2001
United States of America  16.3  15.0  13.6  9.7  8.1  9.1 
European Union (15)  28.1  41.0  42.5  47.2  43.8  41.4 
Japan           0.4  0.4  0.4  7.1  7.9  8.2 
Korea, Republic of  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.7  1.6  1.9 
Canada 3.4  3.2  3.5  2.2  2.0  2.3 
Source: FAOSTAT 
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Chart 1—Net Agricultural Trade of Developed Countries, 1961-2001  
                 (current values, million US dollars) 
 
Developed countries also differ in their agricultural policies.  A synthetic 
indicator of market orientation is the Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC), calculated 
by the OECD for different industrialized countries. A value of 1 indicates that all the 
income received by farmers comes from the market, and any number above 1 indicates 
transfers from consumers and/or taxpayers.
 9 Japan and Korea have NACs above 2.5 
indicating that farmers in those countries receive, on average, 150% more than the market 
values (Chart 2).  The NACs values for Canada, the US and the EU in 2000 indicate that 
                                                 
9 The NAC shows how much of the final price received by farmers comes from the market, valued at world 
prices, and how much the farmer receives as transfers from consumers (in the form of higher prices due to 
trade protection) or from taxpayers (as payments from the government). It does not include government’s 
expenditures in general services such as research and extension, pest control, and the like. Another 
indicator of the OECD, which is quoted more often, is the Producer Support Estimate (PSE).  In simplified 
terms, the PSE shows transfers (from consumer and taxpayers) as percentage of the full price received by 
the farmer (i.e. transfers (TR) divided by the sum of world price (WP) plus transfers, or TR/(WP +TR), 
then shown in percentages), while the NAC is the ratio of the sum of world price and transfers divided by 
































European Union (15) Canada Japan Korea, Republic of United States of America  16
farmers were receiving about 25%, 28%, 60% more than the market value.  On average, 
support to agriculture in those countries has not decreased much, if at all, since the mid 
1980s when the Uruguay Round began, and at least in the case of Korea it has increased 
above the 1986-87 levels (Chart 2).  They appeared to have reached some temporary lows 
around 1997 (due to high world agricultural prices in 1996-1997) but began to increase 
again since then. This temporal pattern of support (with the low in transfers coinciding 
with the world data baseline year of 1997 for the simulations) has implications for the 
model results reported below.   
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USA EU Japan Korea Canada  17
Besides the difference in levels, it is important to determine whether the transfers 
come from consumers or taxpayers, because they have different implications and 
treatment under the WTO legal system based on the three pillars of market access, 
domestic subsidies, and export subsidies.  Transfers from consumers are caused by 
tariffs, quotas, and similar instruments that, within the WTO framework, are discussed 
under market access issues; transfers from taxpayers are some form of farm payments 
more or less linked to production, which are discussed under the rubric of domestic 
support or subsidies; while export subsidies have usually aspects of both, transfers from 
consumers (by maintaining domestic prices higher than would have been otherwise the 
case) and from taxpayers (due to the payment involved).  Chart 3 shows the percentage of 
NAC that comes from consumers in those countries.  In Japan and Korea, transfers to 
farmers come mostly from consumers (about 90%).  For the European Union and 
Canada, the share of consumer transfers is still around 60% (although for Europe it 
represents a decline from about 80% in the mid-1980s), while for the US it has been 
around 50% and has dropped below 40% in 1999 and 2000.  In terms of the WTO 
negotiations, these patterns imply that Japan and Korea rely mostly on market protection 
through high tariffs and small quota access (and are more concerned about market access 
liberalization), while the US uses more domestic subsidies (and is interested in 
maintaining the legal possibility of making those payments under domestic support 
disciplines), with European Countries and Canada in between.      18
Chart 3—Transfer from Consumers, Developed Countries, 1986-2000  
                  (percent of total transfer to farmers) 
 
The NAC also varies by products in the different countries.  Table 9 shows 
average NACs for wheat, feed grains, rice, oilseeds, sugar, milk, and beef and veal over 
the 1990s and the percentage that comes from the consumer.  In general, the levels of 
transfers are the highest in Japan and Korea, except for the case of oilseeds and beef and 
veal in Japan, products in which the EU has larger transfers.  Japan and Korea have 
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Table 9—NAC and Percentage of Transfer from Consumers (average 1990-2000) 
 
  Wheat  Maize  a/ Rice Oilseeds  Sugar  Milk Beef  and 
Veal 
NAC        
USA  1.61 1.26 1.53 1.12 2.15 2.04 1.04 
EU  1.88 1.74 1.81 1.91 2.09 2.16 3.22 
Japan  6.41 6.96 6.05 1.78 2.60 5.09 1.53 
Canada  1.33  1.17 na 1.16 na 2.34  1.07 
Korea  na 5.33  6.24  7.02 na 3.44  2.99 
        
% Consumer Transfers 
USA  14 0  1  0 81  82 5 
EU  28 53 67  0  75 80 59 
Japan  74 74 81  0  82 82 76 
Canada  19  2  na 11 na 79 na 
Korea  na 86 89 88 na 89 89 
         
Source: OECD, 2002. 
   a/ Other Grains for Japan and Korea 
 
The EU has larger transfers than the US in all commodities (except sugar), with 
transfers close to, or above, 100% of market value, except for beef where transfers 
represent about 200% of market values.  Transfers to farmers in those commodities are 
not only high but also rising in different commodities, such as rice for Japan and Korea, 
oilseeds for USA and Japan, and beef and veal for the EU and Korea.  The method of 
transfer also differs, with Canada and the US relying more on domestic subsidies for 
grains and oilseeds, and also for beef and veal.  Japan, Korea, and, to a lesser extent the 
EU, resort to consumers transfers for most of the commodities.  The exceptions for the 
EU are oilseeds and wheat.  Sugar and milk are uniformly supported through consumer 
transfers (border protection).   Similar calculations for some other commodities of 
importance to developing countries, such as fruits and vegetables, are not as readily 
available.    20
The variety of situations in industrialized and developing countries in terms of 
agricultural structure, performance and policies means that the impacts of world trade 
liberalization are potentially very different by country.  Identifying and measuring the 
extent of developing countries’ gains and losses by region from liberalizing world 
agricultural markets are important for understanding the nature of their interest in trade 
reform, as well as for facilitating possible policies to minimize the losses of the 
adjustment process.   
4.  MODEL AND SIMULATIONS 
The framework of analysis is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
with a multi-region and multi-sector specification. The base year is 1997 and most of the 
data come from the database of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), version 5 
(Dimaranan, B. and R. McDougall, 2002).  
The structure of this class of static world CGE is described in greater detail 
elsewhere (see for instance Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson, 2002). The model focuses 
on the real side of the economy, including domestic production, consumption, real 
income and GDP within each country/region, and international trade flows across 
countries/regions.  There are 40 developing countries or country groups (including 
transition economies and central European countries) in the model (see Annex 1).  That is 
the maximum disaggregation of the GTAP database for those categories of countries.  
There are also five other industrialized countries or regions: the US (with Canada), the   21
EU (with EFTA), Japan (with Korea), Australia/New Zealand, and Other Developed.
10 
The model includes 17 agricultural and processed food products and the rest of activities 
in the economy are aggregated in only one sector.
11    
Those products are either sold to the domestic markets, or exported to the other 
countries/regions. On the demand side, there are four different types of demand: 
intermediate demand, consumer demand, government demand, and investment demand.  
All the demands are met either by domestic supply or imports. International trade is 
traced by import destination and export sources, i.e., the bilateral and multilateral trade 
flows among countries/regions are included in the model.  There are 5 factors of 
production: skilled labor, unskilled labor, capital, land, and other natural resources.  
The main institutions of the model are as follows. First, there is a single private 
household in each country that saves a constant proportion of disposable income and 
buys consumption goods. Since there is only a single representative household, the model 
can not be used to assess within-country distributional effects on income or other variable 
resulting from trade liberalization. The assumed aggregate household in each country 
owns the firms but also works there, receiving wages, distributed profits, and lump-sum 
transfers (which may be negative) from the government. The government spends all its 
tax revenues on consumption or lump-sum transfers to households. A capital account 
collects savings and buys investment goods. Producers within a country/region are 
                                                 
10 Other Developed is a residual mostly from Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore). From now onwards the 
references, for brevity, will be to USA, EU, and Japan only.  
11 The complete list includes: Rice; Wheat; Other grains; Vegetables, fruit, and nuts; Oil seeds; Plant-based 
fibers; Other crops; Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses; Other animal products; Wool, silk-worm 
cocoons; Bovine meat products; Other meat products; Vegetable oils and fats; Dairy products; Sugar; Other 
food products; Beverages and tobacco products; Non-agricultural sector.   22
aggregated into one representative firm for each sector, which produces the respective 
good or service, buying intermediate goods and hiring factors of productions. In making 
production decisions, the firms choose the levels of labor and intermediate inputs to 
produce a single sectoral output, taking into account the price of sectoral outputs, the 
wage rate, the prices of intermediate inputs, and the existent stock of capital. Sectoral 
outputs are either sold in the domestic market or exported to foreign markets. 
In a multi-region and multi-sector global model, with an Armington specification, 
the domestically produced and consumed good from each sector is different both from 
the export good generated in that same sector (with that differentiation captured through a 
CET function), and from the imported good corresponding to that sector (utilizing a CES 
function). The composite export and import goods from each sector are differentiated by 
country of origin/destination based on constant elasticity functions acting as an 
aggregator. Commodity trade flows are differentiated by their geographical and sectoral 
origin and destination. 
Domestic and world markets for goods and services equilibrate through changes 
in endogenously determined prices.  Domestic production and consumption prices 
interact with world prices, the real exchange rate per country, different levels of border 
protection, and, if applicable, consumption, production, and export subsidies.   
Factor markets also equilibrate through the interaction of demand, supply and 
prices. In the simulations the supply of all factors of production other than labor are kept 
at the base levels, and there are no changes in inter-country savings and investments 
flows.     23
One innovation in the model developed herein is that the model assumes different 
labor market regimes for developed and developing countries.  Following a long tradition 
in development analysis (see for instance Lewis, 1954) labor markets in developing 
countries are run considering the existence of significant unemployment, with non-
flexible consumption real wages.
 12  This approach differs from many exercises with this 
class of world trade models that consider full employment scenarios with flexible wages 
as the equilibrating variable in developing countries.  In the case of developed countries 
the level of employment remains fixed at the base year, and wages change to clear labor 
markets.  Returns to factors of production (including wages) may vary across sectors in 
the same country due to other imperfections in their markets that are modeled as invariant 
to the policy experiments discussed here.   
A second specific dimension of the model is that it is assumed that trade 
liberalization affects country productivity through different channels such as: a) the 
learning-by-doing, access to new knowledge, and scale effects associated to increased 
exports; b) technological spillovers due to greater availability through imports of better 
capital and intermediate goods for production; and c) the increase in competition in 
previously protected domestic markets due to increased international trade (see the 
discussion of the links between trade, technology and productivity in Balassa, 1989; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1995; and Romer, 1994; for CGE applications with productivity 
linked to trade see, for instance, de Melo and Robinson, 1995).  
                                                 
12  The labor markets can be run with full employment (with wages as the equilibrating variable) or two 
alternative specifications with endogenous unemployment: one with nominal wages fixed and one with real 
wages fixed.  The model reported considers the consumption real wage fixed, i.e. the nominal wages 
deflated by the consumer price index.    24
In each sector’s value-added function that relates sectoral value-added Qt to the 
use of factors of production (e.g. labor (L), capital (K), natural resources (NR))
13, the 
model includes an endogenously determined variable for the level of total factor 
productivity (TFP):   
  Qt = TFPt*F1(Lt, Kt, NRt,) 
Within each country, sectoral TFPs depend on the ratio of total trade (exports plus 
imports divided by two) to GDP. A constant calculated at the base year embodies 
accumulated TFP up to that time, and β is the coefficient linking the trade ratio to TFP: 
TFPt =  Constant*(Trade/GDP)
β  
The assumed annual elasticity of TFP growth to trade openness is 0.06 (see for 
instance Wacziarg, 1998).  In this model it applies only to agricultural products (primary 
and processed).  It implies that an increase of 10 percentage points in the ratio of trade 
openness, increases permanently the growth rate by 0.6% annually.  The model is in 
levels and assumes an accumulation of annual growth over a medium run of five years.  
As a comparison the equivalent elasticity utilized by the World Bank (2001), in the 
Global Economic Prospects 2002, applying to both agriculture and industry, is about 0.2 
per year.  Dessus et al (1999) estimate a value of 0.09 that they apply to all sectors in 
their simulations.  
The US dollar is the world numeraire (i.e. US nominal exchange rate is fixed at 
1), and world prices are expressed in US dollars. Every country has its own nominal 
exchange rate, which floats against the dollar.  There are also endogenously determined 
                                                 
13 Inputs are combined with value added through a Leontieff technology.   25
and country-specific numeraire price indices of domestic goods.  The real exchange rate, 
defined as the ratio of the prices of traded goods to non-traded goods in each 
country/region, is also endogenous in the model.  Capital inflows and components of the 
current account other than trade are considered fixed exogenously at the base levels.  In 
addition to foreign savings, also domestic savings, and government consumption of 
goods and services are kept constant at base levels.  In the simulations when import 
tariffs or domestic subsidies are removed, government transfers to consumers (which may 
be negative) adjust to maintain public accounts in equilibrium.  
We use the world trade model to evaluate 5 basic scenarios in the simulations: 1) 
elimination of protection and subsidies
14 only in the US (and Canada); 2) only in the EU 
(and EFTA); 3) only in Japan (with Korea); 4) in all industrialized countries at the same 
time, but not developing countries; 5) in all countries in the world.  Unfortunately, the 
data available on tariffs did not allow us to take account of existing preferential access 
which can be important for some developing countries, as more recent studies have 
shown. To the extent that tariff preferences are important, our results will overestimate 
the positive and underestimate the negative effects of liberalization by a developed 
country or region. Conversely, relatively low levels of subsidies and protection in our 
base year (as noted above) implies that our results may underestimate the positive effects 
of liberalization. With these caveats in mind, the simulations can be interpreted as the 
gains (or losses, as the case may be) of changing the current policies, or the losses (gains) 
of maintaining current policies.  The simulations consider each one of those 
                                                 
14 The simulations consider the full elimination of protection (tariffs and tariff-equivalent  trade barriers), 
trade-distorting domestic subsidies, and export subsidies.   26
countries/regions only, one at a time. Simulations for all industrialized countries include 
those three countries/regions at the same time, plus others, such as Canada and 
Australia.
15 Each one of those scenarios is run first without, and then with, productivity 




Tables 10 to 20 show the results of the simulations for different variables of 
interest: welfare, total real GDP, agricultural and agroindustrial real GDP, net trade and 
exports, agricultural consumption, and the ratio of agricultural imports to total exports.  
In economic terms, welfare is considered the broadest synthetic indicator measuring 
additional consumption that occurs with the simulated policies.
17 It is important to have 
adequate macroeconomic closures to avoid misleading results such as when consumption 
(and welfare) increases but only because the model allowed to run down assets or 
accumulate liabilities (see Lofgren et al, 2002). The consumption-based welfare measure 
accounts for the combination of both additional production and the changes in prices of 
goods and services that determine the real purchasing power of the additional incomes 
                                                 
15 Because of the complexities of agricultural trade and countries' trading practices, the effects of 
liberalization will change depending on which markets are being liberalized. Consequently, individual 
scenarios depicted in the model simulations should not necessarily add up to the total when all 
industrialized countries liberalize their markets. 
16 Contrary to what has been assumed in much of the development literature, productivity in agriculture has 
been growing faster than in industry in developing countries (see Mitra and Martin, 1999). Including all 
sectors produce stronger results in terms of increased welfare. 
17 The measure can be constructed as the minimum payment that the consumer would require for foregoing 
the policy change (with that payment the consumer is as well off under base prices and income as he/she 
would have been if the change had taken place) or the maximum payment the consumer would be willing 
to make to avoid 
having the simulated change undone (after the payment the consumer would be just as well off as without 
the change).    27
resulting from expanded production.  At the aggregate national level, this implies that 
changes in national product must be adjusted by changes in the terms of trade.   
Total GDP presents a general value of production, which for an economy not 
changing assets or liabilities in the policy experiment (as it should), differs from the 
previous measure mainly because of terms of trade adjustments.  Some analysts prefer to 
emphasize this production focused indicator rather than the previous one, oriented to 
consumption.   
Besides the issue of general GDP, which includes agricultural and non-
agricultural activities, many countries and development advocates, may be more 
interested in the GDP generated in agriculture-related sectors.  After all, some 60% of the 
total population in developing countries lives in rural areas, as it is the case with about 
three-fourths of the 1.2 billion people living with less than $1/day (IFAD, 2001).  
Therefore, the simulation results reported also include changes in agricultural and 
agroindustrial value added. 
WTO negotiations are obviously interested in changes in trade variables. Here, as 
mentioned, the two indicators presented are net agricultural trade (exports minus imports) 
and total agricultural exports. Another important topic in trade liberalization is the impact 
on food security.  The two final indicators presented (agricultural consumption, and the 
ratio of agricultural imports to total exports) are related to food security at the national 
levels (see the discussion of different indicators in Diaz-Bonilla, Thomas, Robinson, and 
Cattaneo, 2000).     28
All these variables measure different things and may move in different directions.  
Welfare may fall even as GDP increases if terms of trade decline significantly.  
Agricultural-related GDP may increase while total GDP decline, if the policies are 
expanding the first sector beyond its more efficient levels, drawing resources from other 
parts of the economy.  Net agricultural trade may increase, while at the same time 
indicators of food security, such as food consumption or the ratio of food imports over 
total exports, may deteriorate.  With those caveats in mind, the different indicators are 
discussed separately.    
WELFARE 
Tables 10 and 11 present the welfare impacts resulting from changes of 
agricultural and trade policies.  The elimination of policy distortions only in 
industrialized countries benefit all developing regions, for a total of about 4 billion 
dollars of net gains.  The exceptions is the region of Turkey, North Africa and the Middle 
East (TNAME, from now onwards),
18 which show losses of about 1.9 billion dollars.  
Several countries in this region face constraints to expand agricultural production, and the 
negative terms of trade effect appears to be larger than the gains from more efficient 
allocation of resources plus the employment effect.  
Without TNAME the welfare gains for the rest of the developing countries 
amount to about 5.9 billions.  Assuming productivity effects for agricultural products, net 
welfare gains go up to 9.4 billion dollars, but TNAME  still shows net losses of 
                                                 
18 North Africa here includes Morocco (which is disaggregated in the GTAP database) and Rest of North 
Africa (which includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia).  Middle East is also an aggregate region in 
GTAP (Annex 1).    29
somewhat less than 1.8 billion dollars.  However, when developing countries eliminate 
their own protection and distortions, there are net welfare gains for all developing regions 
of about 10.5 billions that increase even further to almost 20 billion dollars if productivity 
effects from agricultural trade liberalization are considered.  The negative impact on 
welfare of TNAME from increases in world prices due to the liberalization in 
industrialized countries is compensated by reduction in their own trade protection, for a 
net gain to the consumers (which is what the welfare indicator is measuring), even before 
considering productivity effects.  The implied division of welfare gains in developing  
countries between how much of those gains come from agricultural liberalization in 
industrialized countries and how much from their own liberalization is about 50/50 (with 
productivity gains) and about 40/60 (without TFP effects).  It has been already noticed 
that in several other simulations (see for instance, World Bank, 2001, Tokarick, 2003) 
most of the benefits (typically more than 75% of welfare gains) come from the change in 
developing countries’ own policies. 
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Table 10—Welfare by Regions (change from base, millions of constant US dollars) 
 
  Liberalization in:  
  US  US  EU  EU  Japan  Japan  All DCs  All DCs  All countries  All 
countries 
  plus TFP    plus TFP    plus TFP    plus TFP    plus TFP 
Asia  Developing  -832  244  526 679  1421 1446 1127 1955 3004 5219 
LAC 200  1618  2536 4733  607 616  3409  7268  4513  10119 
SSA 99  295  421 512  107 107  635  916  1244  1739 
 (SSA without South Africa)  129  297  359 427  121 121  627  856  1072  1487 
Transition Economies  -26  145  452 523  112 113  571  793  1347  1734 
Turkey, North Africa, Middle East  -708  -458  -861 -814  -263 -263  -1912  -1770  286  690 
  RoW  -22 94 139 165  28 28 152 285 136 389 
Total Developing  -1290  1939  3212 5796  2012 2047  3982  9449  10530  19891 
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Table 11—Welfare by Countries (change from base in %) 
 
               Liberalization in: 










 plus  TFP  plus 
TFP 
countries plus TFP 
China -0.1  -0.1  0.0 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3 
Indonesia -0.1  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Malaysia 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.4 
Philippines -0.1  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Thailand 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.9  1.0 
Vietnam 0.2  0.2  0.0 0.0  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.5  1.2  1.2 
Bangladesh -0.1  0.0  -0.1 -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.2 
India 0.0  0.2  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.5 
Sri Lanka  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1 -0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.2  0.2  0.4 
Other South Asia  -0.1  0.0  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.4 
México -0.2  -0.2  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0 






















Colombia 0.0  0.2  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.4 
Peru   0.0  0.1  0.2 0.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.4 
Venezuela -0.1  -0.1  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Rest of Andean Pact  0.2  0.3  0.2 0.3  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.6  0.8  1.1 
Argentina 0.1  0.2  0.3 0.6  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.8  0.5  1.2 
Brazil 0.0  0.1  0.1 0.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.2  0.6 
Chile 0.1  0.2  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5 
Uruguay 0.1  0.2  0.6 0.8  0.1  0.1  0.8  1.1  1.3  1.8 
Rest of South America  0.3  0.4  1.2 1.4  0.0  0.0  1.6  1.9  1.8  2.2 
Hungary 0.0  0.0  1.3 1.4  0.1  0.1  1.5  1.5  1.8  1.9 
Poland 0.0  0.0  0.4 0.5  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7 






















Former Soviet Union  0.0  0.0  -0.1 -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.0 
Turkey 0.0  0.0  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4 
Middle East  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.4  -0.4  0.0  0.1 
Morocco   -0.1  0.0  0.1 0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.4 
Rest of North Africa  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.2 
Botswana 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.2 






















Malawi 0.3  0.6  0.1 0.4  0.0  0.0  0.4  1.1  0.7  1.5 
Mozambique 0.3  0.9  0.4 0.5  0.1  0.0  0.7  1.5  0.9  1.8 
Tanzania 0.2  0.4  0.7 0.9  0.1  0.1  1.0  1.5  1.7  2.7 
Zambia 0.0  0.1  0.4 0.6  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.6  0.4  0.6 
Zimbabwe 0.1  0.2  0.5 0.6  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.7  3.7  4.4 
Other Southern Africa  -0.1  -0.1  0.6 0.7  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.7  0.9  1.0 
Uganda 0.1  0.5  0.3 0.6  0.0  0.0  0.5  1.2  0.6  1.7 
Rest of SubSaharan  0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.5 
Rest of the World  0.0  0.0  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2 
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In Table 11 the disaggregated welfare effects show that trade liberalization by 
industrialized countries, has positive effects on most developing countries (including 
Turkey that before appeared together with the North Africa and Middle East regions), 
with some exceptions: in addition to the negative effect on Rest of North Africa and 
Middle East, there are some negative impacts on Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Mexico and the group of countries of the Former Soviet Union (see Annex 1). However, 
once these countries liberalize their own agriculture, all negative signs disappear except 
for the Former Soviet Union and the Rest of North Africa.  If, in addition, productivity 
effects are incorporated, only the Rest of North Africa still shows a small negative sign. 
This is a heterogeneous region that combines oil producers with a large net importer of 
cereals such as Egypt, a country that would also benefit from better market access to 
developed countries in other agricultural products.  It would be important that in future 
versions of the GTAP data base Egypt is considered separately.
19 This is still a second-
best result considering that the simulations do not include liberalization of the industrial 
sector, which in some cases, as textiles, may be important for some of the countries in the 
region. 
Looking at the impact of different industrialized countries’ policies, liberalization 
of the European Union brings the larger aggregate gains in welfare for developing 
countries as a whole (some 3.2 billion dollars, that go up to 5.8 billion if productivity 
effects are considered), with the larger gains accruing to Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Table 10).  The next larger effects is for Japan (about 2 billion dollars, with or 
                                                 
19 For instance simulations with a dynamic CGE model for Egypt alone suggest that expanding market 
access for agricultural products (particularly in the European Union) have strong positive effects on growth 
and poverty alleviation (see Moataz El-Said, Hans Lofgren and Sherman Robinson, 2001).  Also it can be 
noticed that for Morocco, which appears as an individual country, the results are positive.   33
without productivity effects), which benefits mostly Asia.  Liberalization in the US 
without productivity effects shows an aggregate negative welfare effect (-1.3 billion), 
resulting basically from the negative impacts on China (about 670 million), Mexico 
(some 520 million), and the Middle East (about 510 million).  Not counting these 
countries/regions, the aggregate is positive (about 400 million dollars).  Considering 
productivity effects the net welfare for developing countries from elimination of US 
protection and subsidies now turn positive in about 1.9 billion dollars.  Looking at the 
disaggregation in Table 11 the results of liberalization (counting productivity gains) in 
Europe generates the largest number of positive values (29 cases over 40), followed by 
US (19), and then Japan (13).  The largest number of negatives comes from the 
liberalization of US policies (7), followed by the EU (5) and Japan (1)—with other values 
essentially zero.  The positive welfare impacts of liberalization in the EU appear to be 
larger for Africa
20 (in percentage of base consumption), followed by LAC.  The same 
pattern applies to the US, although the percentage values are smaller.  The positive 
impact of Japan concentrates in Asia.  
The differences in welfare impact from liberalizing industrialized countries 
agricultural policies (such as the US versus the EU) is due to the different combination of 
instruments and products.  Domestic and export subsidies from industrialized countries 
affect producers in developing countries but may help consumers there, at least on the 
demand side through lower world prices (there is still the question of displaced 
production and employment opportunities, but the relative balance of both effects will 
vary by country).  Market protection in industrialized countries, although it may also 
have a depressing effect on world prices (and in that case would also benefit consumers), 
                                                 
20 See Annex 1 for the composition of  “Other Southern Africa” and “Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.”   34
appears to have a larger negative impact on production and export opportunities of 
developing countries.  As indicated, the consumption-based welfare measure  combines 
both the potential additional income from higher production and employment and the 
benefits to consumers from lower prices.  These two effects need not move in the same 
direction, with the possibility that a reduction (expansion) in production and employment 
may be more than compensated by lower (higher) domestic prices for an overall welfare 
gain (loss).
 21  
It has been noted that US uses relatively more domestic subsidies, and they 
concentrate more on cereals, which for a number of developing countries constitute an 
important component of food imports and an input to other activities (such as animal 
feed). Therefore for some countries there may be a negative impact on the consumption 
side but also on the production of other activities that use grains as inputs.  The US (with 
Canada) also have relatively lower levels of market protection than other industrialized 
countries.  The EU/EFTA and Japan/Korea, on the other hand,  rely more on market 
access restrictions, and, in the case of the European countries, market access restrictions 
cover a larger number of commodities.  Therefore, liberalization of agriculture in the EU 
and Japan has a more uniform positive welfare effect than similar changes in the US (see 
Table 9 and Chart 3).  However, it should be noticed that in the benchmark year 1997, the 
2002 US Farm Bill was still not in place, and, the US did not have large cotton subsidies, 
                                                 
21 Other simulations (for instance, Dimaranan, Hertel, and Keeney, 2003) have estimated that reduction of 
agricultural protection in industrialized countries have larger positive welfare gains for developing 
countries compared to the elimination of domestic subsidies in rich countries (which in fact, in those 
simulations with a full employment specification, may result in welfare losses for several developing 
countries).   35
that later emerged as an important issue for developing countries, particularly in Africa 
(see Minot and Daniels, 2002).
22   
In general, it should also be noticed, that all developed countries in the 1997 year 
had the lowest level of domestic support and transfers for most of the decade (see Chart 
2), which would lead to the underestimation of the positive effect on developing countries 
of the elimination of current and higher distortions in industrialized countries.  
TOTAL GDP 
The elimination of policy distortions only in industrialized countries increases 
GDP in all developing regions by about 8.6 billion dollars (Table 12).  Again the 
exception is the TNAME region with losses of about 600 million dollars.  As indicated 
this region faces constraints to expand primary agricultural production and because in this 
simulation developing countries maintain their own protection, higher prices in world 
markets affect activities that now must use more costly agricultural raw materials 
(including several agroindustrial productions, but also other primary agricultural 
activities, such as some livestock and dairy productions that may use grains as inputs).  
Assuming productivity effects for agricultural products, total GDP increases by about 
14.3 billion dollars, with TNAME still showing a net loss of some 500 million dollars.  
However, when developing countries eliminate their own protection and distortions, GDP 
increases for all developing regions by about 28.6 (without productivity effects) to some 
38 billions (with productivity effects).  The differences in welfare (consumption) and 
GDP (production) results result from price and terms-of-trade effects.   
                                                 
22 These subsidies on a product that is not utilized internally by the low income producers in Africa, lead to 
welfare losses by displacing production without compensatory welfare effects from lower domestic prices.   36
The larger expansionary effects on the GDP of developing countries’ regions 
result from the elimination of protection and subsidies in the European Union, and LAC 
is the region that shows largest GDP gains.  Agricultural liberalization in the US shows 
negative effects on GDP for developing countries as a whole due to the negative impact 
on Asia and TNAME, but only if productivity effects are not considered.  As indicated 
above, agricultural liberalization in the US concentrates relatively more on grains.  These 
are inputs to other activities that may be affected negatively by higher prices of those 
inputs.   
Table 13 looks at the disaggregated GDP effects.  The elimination of protection and 
subsidies in industrialized countries have positive effects on most developing countries 
and developing countries’ regions, with the exception of Middle East, Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, the countries of the Former Soviet Union (although the small negative impact 
disappears once productivity gains are considered), Botswana, and Other Southern 
Africa.  For another 3 developing countries or regions the impact is about zero.  But 
again, once these countries liberalize their own agriculture all negative signs (and zeroes) 
disappear even without factoring productivity gains.  Liberalizing agriculture only in 
developed countries while maintaining protection and subsidies in developing countries 
seems to lead to a larger expansion of agriculture in the latter countries than what would 
be efficient, limiting the expansion of total GDP.  When agriculture is also liberalized in 
developing countries, resources are utilized more efficiently across the whole economy, 
leading to an expansion of total GDP.   
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Table 12—GDP by Developing Regions (change from base, millions of constant US dollars) 
 
  Liberalization in:  
  US  US  EU  EU  Japan  Japan  All DCs  All DCs  All countries  All countries 
    plus TFP    plus TFP    plus TFP    plus TFP    plus TFP 
Asia  Developing  -363  590 1442 1530  2402  2445 3611 4328  10498  12354 
LAC  172 1751  2679  5116 554  564 3469  7780  7433  13639 
SSA  121  274  442 523 119  105 696 928  1740  2169 
 (SSA without South Africa)  143  274  364  423  141  127  673  850  1473  1823 
Transition Economies  14  182  990  1044  119  119  1176  1416  4332  4700 
Turkey, North Africa, Middle East  -375  -154  66  71  -260  -260  -613  -520  3898  4218 
ROW  0  99  222 247  25  25 271 395  691  913 
Total Developing  -430  2742  5840  8532  2958  2997  8609  14327  28592  37993 
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Table 13—GDP by Developing Countries (change from base in %) 
 Liberalization  in: 








 plus  TFP
China 0.0  0.0  0.1 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.7  0.7 
Indonesia 0.0  0.0  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3 
Malaysia -0.1  0.0  0.0 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.7 
Philippines -0.2  -0.1  0.0 0.0  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.8 
Thailand 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.7  1.2  1.3 
Vietnam 0.3  0.3  0.0 0.0  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.6  1.5  1.5 
Bangladesh -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.4  0.5 
India 0.0  0.1  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.6 
Sri Lanka  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1 -0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.2  0.6  0.8 
Other South Asia  0.0  0.1  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.7 
Mexico -0.1  -0.1  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2 






















Colombia 0.0  0.2  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.7 
Peru   0.0  0.1  0.1 0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6 
Venezuela -0.1  -0.1  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.3 
Rest of Andean Pact  0.3  0.4  0.3 0.3  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.7  1.4  1.6 
Argentina 0.1  0.2  0.2 0.6  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.8  0.5  1.3 
Brazil 0.0  0.1  0.1 0.3  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.2  0.7 
Chile 0.1  0.2  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.6 
Uruguay 0.1  0.2  0.5 0.6  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.9  1.6  2.1 
Rest of S.America  0.5  0.5  1.5 1.7  0.0  0.0  2.1  2.4  3.7  4.1 
Hungary 0.0  0.0  1.6 1.6  0.0  0.0  1.7  1.8  2.4  2.5 
Poland 0.0  0.0  0.5 0.5  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.6  1.1  1.2 






















Fr. Soviet Union  0.0  0.0  -0.1 -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.3  0.4 
Turkey 0.0  0.0  0.2 0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.6 
Middle East  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.3  0.6  0.6 
Morocco   0.0  0.1  0.4 0.4  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.5  0.7  1.0 
Rest of N. Africa  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4 
Botswana 0.0  0.0  -0.2 -0.2  0.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.1  0.1  0.2 






















Malawi 0.3  0.6  0.1 0.4  0.0  0.0  0.4  1.0  0.7  1.4 
Mozambique 0.3  0.7  0.3 0.4  0.0  0.0  0.6  1.2  0.9  1.6 
Tanzania 0.2  0.4  0.7 0.9  0.1  0.1  1.1  1.5  2.1  2.9 
Zambia 0.0  0.0  0.5 0.6  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.7  0.5  0.7 
Zimbabwe 0.2  0.2  0.4 0.5  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.7  4.2  4.9 
Other Southern Africa  -0.2  -0.1  -0.3 -0.2  0.1  0.1  -0.3  -0.2  0.2  0.4 
Uganda 0.1  0.5  0.4 0.6  0.0  0.0  0.5  1.1  0.8  1.6 
Rest of SubSaharan  0.1  0.1  0.2 0.2  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.7 
Rest of the World  0.0  0.0  0.1 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4   39
As before, reduction in protection and subsidies in the EU benefits the largest 
number of developing countries (31 positives, 6 negatives, and 3 about unchanged), 
followed by the US (20 positive, 7 negative, and 13 unchanged).  Liberalization in Japan 
leaves unaffected the largest number of developing countries, with most of the positive 
effects appearing in the Asian region.   
AGRICULTURAL GDP 
Considering the importance of agriculture in developing countries, and the 
significance of rural poverty, it seems important to analyze the impact of agricultural 
liberalization on value added in that sector (including agroindustrial activities).  Table 14 
shows the changes in agricultural value added in constant dollars
23 (i.e. payment to 
factors of production in agriculture and food processing production in developing 
countries, but not counting related jobs in transportation, commerce, and non-agricultural 
inputs) if current policies were modified.  For developing countries as a whole, 
agricultural value added increases by between 20.3 billion dollars (no productivity 
effects) to almost 23 billion dollars per year (with productivity effects) when 
industrialized countries eliminate their subsidies and protection, with the largest increase 
in production (in absolute value) taking place in LAC (between 6.1 to 7.9 billion dollars) 
followed by Asia (5.9 to 6.4 billion dollars).  However, calculated as percentage of the 
value added the impact is larger for SSA: between 3.1-3.4%, while for LAC is between 
2.2-2.9% and for Asia is less than 2%. Changes in EU policies have the largest impact 
                                                 
23 Other simulations presented in Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson, August 2003 are in nominal values, 
i.e. the constant values presented here adjusted by the corresponding price deflator resulting from the 
simulations.  The nominal values have been reported widely in the press.    40
overall (between 11.4 and 12.6 billion dollars), followed by the US (between 5-6.7  
billion dollars) with the most important negative effects (in absolute values) of 
maintaining current policies being felt by LAC.  Japan’s policies affect mostly other 
Asian countries: more than 2/3 of the displacement of production if current policies are 
maintained takes place there.  
SSA is hurt relatively more by EU policies: while total displacement of 
agricultural and agroindustrial value added (resulting from current agricultural policies in 
industrialized countries) amounts to 1.7-1.9 billion dollars for that region, EU alone 
would displace between 1.2-1.3 billion dollars of agricultural value added.
24  
Table 15 shows the percentage changes for all 40 developing countries and 
regions included in the model.  Primary agriculture and agroindustrial production 
expands in all developing countries when industrialized countries reduce their 
agricultural protection and subsidies.  These results have implications for the debate, 
mainly in rich countries, about the “multifunctional” effects of agriculture, i.e. the notion 
that additional positive results flowing from agriculture – such as beautiful landscapes or 
environmental protection – justify its subsidization and protection.  It seems clear that 
subsidies and protection in rich countries displace agricultural production in developing 
countries, which, if the argument about the multifunctional nature of agriculture were 
true, would imply that those effects, along with the displaced production, are also negated 
to developing countries (see Díaz-Bonilla E. and J. Tin 2002). 
                                                 
24 As already indicated, individual scenarios in the simulations should not necessarily add up to the total 
when all industrialized countries liberalize their markets. Therefore the comparison in the text is just an 
approximation.    41
Table 14—Agricultural Value Added by Developing Regions (change from base, millions of constant US dollars) 
 
                    Liberalization in: 
  US  US  EU  EU  Japan  Japan  All DCs  All DCs  All countries  All countries 








 plus  TFP 
Asia  Developing  1528 2228 1945 2021 2214 2235 5929 6462  4882  6275 
LAC  2169 2863 3231 4244  552  558 6078 7936  6403  9153 
SSA  341  458 1210 1267  140  141 1738 1911  1880  2190 
(SSA without South Africa)  288  397  905  956  76  76  1299  1458  1433  1728 
Transition  Economies  241  305 2375 2402  183  183 2872 2953  2520  2667 
Turkey, North Africa, 





















RoW  64 124 423 437  46  46 552 621  405  534 
TOTAL  4977  6728 11402 12577  3246  3273 20263 22977  17050  21887 
Note: Includes primary and agroindustrial sectors. 
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Table 15—Agricultural Value Added by Developing Countries (change from base in %) 
 
 Liberalization  in: 
















 plus  TFP 
China 0.4  0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 1.5  1.5  0.5  0.7 
Indonesia 0.3  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 1.1  1.2  1.2  1.4 
Malaysia 0.6  0.8 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.4 2.4  2.4  6.7  6.8 
Philippines 0.6  0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.3  1.4  -0.1  0.1 
Thailand 2.0  2.2 2.3 2.3 5.8 6.0 10.3  10.7  11.6  12.2 
Vietnam 1.2  1.3 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 2.8  2.9  6.2  6.4 
Bangladesh 0.3  0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6  0.6  -0.1  0.2 
India 0.2  0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.7  1.1  0.7  1.4 
Sri Lanka  0.1  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6  0.7  0.8  1.3 
Other South Asia  0.3  0.5 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 1.0  1.2  0.6  1.1 
México 1.0  1.1 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.8  2.0  1.0  1.2 
C. America and Caribbean  3.8  4.2 3.3 3.4 1.1 1.1 8.3  9.0  7.6  8.7 
Colombia 1.0  1.5 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 1.6  2.1  1.5  2.3 
Peru   0.7  1.0 1.7 2.1 0.2 0.2 2.6  3.2  2.5  3.3 
Venezuela 0.6  0.7 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.1  1.2  0.2  0.3 
Rest of Andean Pact  1.8  2.2 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.2 3.0  3.6  4.2  5.4 
Argentina 0.3  0.6 1.1 1.9 0.1 0.1 1.5  2.6  2.3  4.1 
Brazil 0.4  0.6 1.1 1.5 0.2 0.2 1.7  2.4  1.9  2.9 
Chile 0.8  1.0 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.2 2.3  2.5  3.2  3.6 
Uruguay 0.6  0.7 2.8 3.3 0.4 0.4 3.8  4.6  6.6  8.3 
Rest of South America  2.5  2.8 10.5 11.8 0.1 0.1 13.3  15.0  14.7  17.1 
Hungary 0.4  0.5 13.3 13.6 0.7 0.7 14.5  15.0  16.6  17.3 
Poland 0.2  0.3 4.2 4.3 0.1 0.1 4.6  4.8  4.5  4.9 
Rest of Centr.Europ.Assoc  0.2  0.3 2.8 2.8 0.2 0.2 3.3  3.3  2.7  2.8 
Former Soviet Union  0.5  0.6 3.0 3.0 0.4 0.4 4.0  4.1  3.0  3.2 
Turkey 0.7  0.8 1.5 1.5 0.1 0.1 2.3  2.4  2.1  2.3 
Middle East  0.8  0.8 3.7 3.7 0.2 0.2 4.8  4.8  -0.4  -0.5 
Morocco   0.4  0.5 2.5 2.5 0.1 0.1 3.0  3.2  1.1  1.7 
Rest of North Africa  0.6  0.7 1.7 1.7 0.1 0.1 2.5  2.4  0.9  1.0 
Botswana 0.1  0.2 14.4 14.3 0.1 0.1 14.6  14.7  13.1  13.0 
South Africa and Rest SACU  0.6  0.7 3.4 3.4 0.7 0.7 4.9  5.0  5.0  5.1 
Malawi 0.7  1.4 0.8 1.4 0.1 0.1 1.6  2.9  2.0  3.7 
Mozambique 2.5  3.8 1.1 1.4 0.1 0.1 3.7  5.3  4.1  6.0 
Tanzania 0.5  0.9 1.3 1.8 0.2 0.2 2.1  2.9  2.6  4.4 
Zambia 0.1  0.2 4.4 4.9 0.0 0.0 4.5  5.1  4.6  5.1 
Zimbabwe 0.7  0.9 3.3 3.5 0.1 0.1 4.1  4.5  12.8  15.5 
Other Southern Africa  0.8  0.9 10.5 11.2 0.2 0.2 11.3  12.1  10.2  11.0 
Uganda 0.3  0.9 0.6 1.1 0.1 0.1 1.0  2.2  1.2  2.9 
Rest of SubSaharan  0.6  0.7 1.6 1.5 0.2 0.2 2.4  2.5  2.3  2.6 
Rest of the World  0.1  0.3 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.1 1.2  1.4  0.9  1.2 
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If developing countries liberalize their own agricultural policies, there are 20 
developing countries and regions that expand further their own agricultural production, 
showing the importance of South-South trade.  For another 13 countries/regions, the 
levels of primary and processed agricultural products once developing countries 
liberalized their own policies stay below the levels that would have been attained only 
under liberalization of the agricultural policies of industrialized countries.  Finally, in the 
case of two countries (Philippines and Bangladesh) and Middle East region, agricultural 
production declines compared to the baseline if productivity effects are not considered.  
However, for the first two countries the impact turns positive if productivity effects are 
present, but not for the Middle East.  In fact, for the latter, the increase in productivity in 
the rest of developing countries due to agricultural liberalization seems to more than 
compensate its own productivity improvements, and in a region that may lack the 
necessary natural resource base, its own agricultural production declines a little further.  
AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
The impact of changes in policies on trade are shown in Tables 16 and 17.  Net 
trade (exports minus imports) in billion dollars increase from about 20.4 billion dollars in 
the base year to some 60-61 billion dollars if only industrialized countries liberalize their 
agricultural policies (an increase of about 40 billion dollars).  The result is the 
combination of an increase in exports of about $37 billion (from total exports of $147 
billion to $184 billion, see Table 17), and a substitution of previous imports of about $3 
billion.  All developing regions either increase their net trade position (if already positive) 
or reduce the negative values (if imports exceed exports) compared to the baseline.   44
Table 16—Agricultural Net Trade by Developing Countries (billion US dollars) 
 
  Liberalization in: 
    US  US  EU  EU  Japan  Japan  All DCs All DCs  All countries All countries
  base    plus TFP  plus TFP    plus TFP    plus TFP   plus TFP 
Asia Developing  12.3 15.5  15.6 15.6  15.6  15.6  15.7  22.7 22.8  15.1  15.3 
LAC 31.7 36.9  37.1 39.0  39.3  32.5  32.5  45.8 46.4  44.4  45.4 
SSA 7.4 8.1  8.1 9.6  9.6  7.6  7.6  10.6 10.7  10.8  10.9 
 (SSA without South Africa)  6.3 6.9  6.9 7.8  7.8  6.4  6.4  8.5 8.6  8.8  8.9 
Transition Economies  -11.1 -10.7  -10.6 -6.1  -6.0  -10.7  -10.7  -4.9 -4.8  -7.9  -7.8 
Turkey, North Africa, Middle East  -17.3 -16.5 -16.5 -14.1  -14.1 -17.0  -17.0  -12.8 -12.8  -18.7  -18.8 
RoW  -2.5 -2.3 -2.3 -1.7  -1.7 -2.4  -2.4  -1.4 -1.4  -1.9  -1.9 




Table 17—Agricultural Exports by Developing Countries (billion US dollars) 
 
  Liberalization in: 
  US  US  EU  EU  Japan  Japan  All DCs All DCs  All countries All countries
  base    plus TFP  plus TFP    plus TFP    plus TFP   plus TFP 
Asia Developing  46.4 49.3  49.4 49.4  49.4  49.7  49.7  56.3  56.3  61.0  61.1 
LAC 59.1 63.9  64.1 66.6  66.9  60.0  60.0  73.1  73.7  78.4  79.3 
SSA 14.6 15.3  15.3 16.6  16.6  14.9  14.9  17.6  17.7  19.0  19.1 
 (SSA without South Africa)  11.8 12.4  12.4 13.1  13.1  11.9  11.9  13.8  13.9  15.0  15.1 
Transition Economies  13.9 14.6  14.6 18.7  18.7  14.3  14.3  20.0  20.1  21.8  21.8 
Turkey, North Africa, Middle East  10.1 10.5 10.5 12.0  12.0  10.2  10.2 12.7 12.7  13.8  13.8 
RoW  3.2 3.3 3.3 3.7  3.7  3.3  3.3 4.0 4.0  4.3  4.3 
Total Developing  147.2 157.0  157.3 167.0  167.2  152.3  152.3  183.8  184.4 198.2  199.3 
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The largest effect on net trade creation in developing regions comes from 
liberalization in the EU (for a total of somewhat more than 42 billion dollars), followed 
by the US (about 31 billion dollars), and then Japan (almost 26 billion dollars).  The 
developing region that expand their net trade the most when only industrialized countries 
liberalize is LAC, followed by Asia.  These benefits are distributed based on regional 
trading patterns.  For sub-Saharan Africa, nearly two-thirds of its increase in exports ($2 
billion of $3 billion) would result from trade liberalization in the European Union.  For 
Asia’s developing countries, the results would be more balanced, with the United States, 
European Union and Japan each contributing a third to their overall gain. Meanwhile, for 
many Latin American countries, most of their increase in agricultural exports would be 
due to opening EU and US markets. As the largest market in world agricultural trade, the 
European Union’s agricultural policies have important effects on developing countries. 
While the majority of developing countries share a common interest in calling for more 
open EU trade, more open Japanese, Korean and US markets also are in the interest of 
developing countries, especially those located in Asia and the Western Hemisphere.  
The increase in net trade by developing countries is smaller if both industrialized 
and developing countries eliminate protection and subsidies (an increase of around 22 
billion dollars, moving from the baseline value of some 20 billion dollars in net trade to 
about 42-43 billion dollars).  When all countries liberalize, the largest value of net trade 
creation is still in LAC, but now followed by SSA.  It was mentioned that all developing 
regions  increased their net trade position when only industrialized countries liberalize.  
However, if all countries liberalize, TNAME moves toward a more negative net trade   46
position compared to the baseline, while Asia, Transition Economies and ROW give back 
some of the net trade gains compared to the scenario where only industrialized countries 
liberalize agricultural production, but still remain above the baseline value.  
Table 17 shows that exports expand for all developing regions, both when only 
industrialized countries liberalize and when all countries do, suggesting that the declines 
in net trade position for some regions when developing countries reduce protection and 
subsidies is caused by larger imports and not by displacement of exports.  
Table 18 presents disaggregated data on net trade.  When only industrialized 
countries liberalize all countries either expand their positive net trade, or reduce the 
absolute value of their negative trade position (i.e. for all of them exports expanded more 
than imports).  But if all countries liberalize, there are six countries or regions where total 
imports expand more than total exports compared to the base: China, Philippines, 
Bangladesh, Venezuela, Middle East, and Botswana.  China in fact moves from a positive 
value of net agricultural trade in the base to a negative one in the scenario of world 
liberalization.  Although a narrow trade focus would seem to imply a negative effect of 
their own agricultural liberalization, it must be remembered that these countries also 
benefited from consumption effects (through lower prices), and production effects (due to 
better allocation of resources), leading to improved welfare and larger total GDP when 
they also liberalize their own agriculture.      47
Table 18—Agricultural Net Trade by Developing Countries (billion US dollars) 
                                             Liberalization in: 
   US  US  EU EU  Japan Japan  All 
DCs 




  base    plus TFP  plus TFP   plus 
TFP 
  plus TFP    plus TFP
China 1.1  2.1  2.2 2.3 2.3  2.5  2.5  4.8  4.8  -1.1  -1.1 
Indonesia 1.1  1.5  1.6 1.5 1.5  1.3  1.3  2.2  2.2  1.9  1.9 
Malaysia 2.0  2.1  2.1 2.1 2.1  2.0  2.0  2.4  2.4  2.6  2.6 
Philippines  -1.3  -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -0.9  -0.9  -1.6  -1.6 
Thailand 5.0  5.7  5.7 5.6 5.6  6.5  6.5  7.8  7.9  7.8  7.9 
Vietnam 1.4  1.5  1.5 1.5 1.5  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.8  1.8 
Bangladesh  -0.7  -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6  -0.6  -0.8  -0.8 
India 4.9  5.4  5.4 5.6 5.6  5.0  5.0  6.3  6.3  5.8  5.9 
Sri  Lanka  -0.1  -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Other  South  Asia  -1.3  -1.2 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -0.9  -0.9  -1.3  -1.2 
Mexico  -0.5  0.6  0.6 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.3  1.4  1.4  0.1  0.1 
Central America and 
Caribbean 
3.5 4.8  4.8 4.5 4.6  3.8  3.8  6.2 6.3  5.4  5.6 
Colombia 2.7  3.2  3.2 2.8 2.9  2.7  2.7  3.4  3.4  3.2  3.2 
Peru   0.9  1.1  1.1 1.2 1.2  1.0  1.0  1.4  1.4  1.2  1.3 
Venezuela  -1.0  -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8  -0.8  -1.1  -1.1 
Rest of Andean Pact  2.4  2.6  2.7 2.6 2.6  2.4  2.4  2.8  2.8  2.9  2.9 
Argentina 11.0  11.6  11.6 12.7 12.8  11.0  11.0  13.4  13.6  14.4  14.8 
Brazil 8.6  9.6  9.7 11.1 11.2  8.8  8.8  12.7  12.9  12.6  12.9 
Chile 2.8  3.1  3.1 3.1 3.1  2.9  2.9  3.4  3.4  3.6  3.6 
Uruguay 0.9  0.9  0.9 1.1 1.1  0.9  0.9  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.3 
Rest of South America  0.3  0.4  0.4 0.7 0.7  0.3  0.3  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.8 
Hungary 1.5  1.6  1.6 2.7 2.7  1.6  1.6  2.8  2.8  2.9  2.9 
Poland  -0.5  -0.4 -0.4 0.7 0.7 -0.5 -0.5  0.8  0.8  0.4  0.4 


















Former Soviet Union  -11.0  -10.7  -10.7 -9.2 -9.2  -10.7  -10.7  -8.5  -8.5  -10.4  -10.4 
Turkey 0.2  0.5  0.5 0.9 0.9  0.3  0.3  1.2  1.2  0.8  0.8 
Middle East  -11.3  -11.1  -11.1 -9.9 -9.9  -11.2  -11.2  -9.4  -9.4  -13.4  -13.4 
Morocco   0.2  0.2  0.2 0.5 0.5  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.6  0.2  0.2 
Rest of North Africa  -6.4  -6.1  -6.1 -5.6 -5.6  -6.3  -6.3  -5.2  -5.2  -6.4  -6.4 
Botswana  -0.2  -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 


















Malawi 0.4  0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Mozambique 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Tanzania 0.4  0.4  0.4 0.4 0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Zambia 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Zimbabwe 1.0  1.0  1.1 1.1 1.1  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.6  1.7 
Other Southern Africa  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 0.3 0.3  -0.1  -0.1  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2 
Uganda 0.5  0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Rest of SubSaharan  4.2  4.6  4.6 5.0 4.9  4.2  4.2  5.5  5.5  5.3  5.3 
Rest of the World  -2.5  -2.3  -2.3 -1.7 -1.7  -2.4  -2.4  -1.4  -1.4  -1.9  -1.9   48
FOOD SECURITY 
Certainly, from the point of view of food security it is more relevant to look at 
consumption, and not production, of food. For instance, Smith and Haddad, 2000, have 
shown that, along with other factors (such as women education and health care), 
increases in total national availability of food (which includes imports along with 
domestic production) have a positive impact on the decline of child malnutrition. When 
only industrialized countries liberalize their agricultural policies there is more production 
of agricultural and food processed goods in developing countries (see Tables 14 and 15).  
But at the same time there may be less domestic agricultural consumption overall, 
because imports are curtailed by more than the amount of increased production (in the 
case of net importers), or because the expansion of exports (due to better world prices) is 
larger than the growth in production (in the case of net sellers).   
Table 19 shows changes in consumption of all agricultural goods (a somewhat 
larger set than only food items).  When only industrialized countries liberalize and 
technological change is not considered, about 21 countries or regions show declining 
consumption compared to the base while 15 countries or regions present increases (the 
rest remain without changes, at one decimal).  If technical change is allowed, then the 
reverse occurs: more countries or regions show increases (21) than declines (18).  Middle 
East and the Rest of North Africa are the regions showing the largest percentages 
declines in agricultural consumption as a result of agricultural trade liberalization in 
developed countries.     49
Table 19—Agricultural Consumption by Developing Countries (change from base in %)  
 Liberalization  in: 




    plus TFP   plus TFP   plus 
TFP 
  plus TFP    plus TFP 
China -0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.4  0.6 
Indonesia -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.4  -0.4  -0.2  0.0 
Malaysia -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -0.5  1.9  2.0 
Philippines -0.6  -0.5  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  -0.6  -0.6  0.8  1.0 
Thailand -0.1  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -0.7  -0.5  1.9  2.1 
Vietnam -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.3  -0.2  1.0  1.2 
Bangladesh -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.1  0.4 
India 0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.3  0.2  0.9 
Sri Lanka  -0.2  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.3  -0.3  0.3  0.7 
Other South Asia  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.3  -0.1  0.8  1.3 
Mexico -0.6  -0.5  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  -0.5  -0.4  0.1  0.3 
C. America and Caribbean  -0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.5  1.6  2.1 
Colombia -0.2  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.2  0.2  0.3  0.8 
Peru   -0.1  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.8  1.4 
Venezuela -0.3  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.3  -0.2  0.5  0.6 
Rest of Andean Pact  0.2  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.7  1.7  2.3 
Argentina 0.0  0.3  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.9  0.4  1.7 
Brazil 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.7  0.4  1.3 
Chile 0.2  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.5  1.1  1.4 
Uruguay 0.1  0.2  0.7  1.0  0.0  0.1  0.9  1.3  2.8  3.7 
Rest of South America  0.4  0.5  1.5  1.8  0.0  0.0  2.0  2.4  5.9  6.5 
Hungary 0.0  0.1  -0.6  -0.5  0.1  0.1  -0.6  -0.4  1.8  2.0 
Poland 0.0  0.0  -0.3  -0.3  0.0  0.0  -0.4  -0.2  1.5  1.8 
Rest of C. European Assoc.  0.0  0.1  -0.4  -0.4  0.0  0.0  -0.4  -0.3  1.2  1.3 
Fr. Soviet Union  0.0  0.0  -0.7  -0.7  0.0  0.0  -0.7  -0.7  0.7  0.8 
Turkey -0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.8 
Middle East  -0.5  -0.4  -1.1  -1.1  -0.1  -0.1  -1.8  -1.7  2.2  2.3 
Morocco   -0.2  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  -0.2  0.0  1.1  1.7 
Rest of North Africa  -0.3  -0.2  -0.5  -0.5  0.0  0.0  -0.9  -0.9  -0.2  -0.1 
Botswana 0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  1.3  1.5 
South Africa, Rest SACU  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.7  0.8 
Malawi 0.2  0.6  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.5  1.5 
Mozambique -0.2  0.8  0.3  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.4  0.4  1.9 
Tanzania 0.2  0.4  0.7  1.0  0.1  0.1  0.9  1.5  1.7  3.0 
Zambia 0.0  0.1  0.2  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.6  0.2  0.6 
Zimbabwe 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.5  4.4  5.4 
Other Southern Africa  -0.1  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.5  2.3  2.6 
Uganda 0.0  0.6  0.2  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.2  1.3  0.3  1.9 
Rest of SubSaharan  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.6 
Rest of the World  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.3  -0.1  0.3  0.5 
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Looking at the policy impacts of different industrialized countries and not 
allowing for technical change in developing countries, agricultural trade liberalization in 
the US generates the largest number of countries or regions with declining consumption 
compared to those increasing it (20 to 8). However, with technical progress in developing 
countries the numbers switch completely for the US with 9 declines against 20 increases 
(as before the balance is composed by countries or regions with negligible changes).  For 
the EU negative changes in consumption are less than increases (14 cases of 
countries/regions with declines versus 16 with increases), and the balance turns even 
more positive with technical change (13 declines against 18 increases).  Those results are 
driven by the assumption in the model that agricultural productivity is related to trade.  
As overall trade increases for the developing countries in these scenarios, then changes in 
TFP lead to larger  production and consumption.  Agricultural trade liberalization in 
Japan leaves agricultural consumption unchanged in the majority of developing countries 
and regions (Table 19).   
Overall, even with technical change there appears to be a non-trivial number of 
developing countries and regions that would reduce their consumption of agricultural 
goods with agricultural trade liberalization in industrialized countries, which, although 
the percentages are small in most cases, could potentially affect food security (at least in 
aggregate terms).  This result, however, disappears almost completely once developing 
countries also liberalize agricultural.  Then only Indonesia and the Rest of North Africa 
show small declines in consumption, and, once technical change is allowed, there is only 
a small decline in the latter.  This result highlights the importance for some of the food   51 
importing developing countries with high food import tariffs to consider reducing them 
progressively to cushion the impact of higher world prices on the domestic markets, 
while at the same time investing in rural infrastructure and agricultural technology to 
expand production.  
Table 20 presents the value of agricultural imports as percentage over total 
exports, indicating the trade effort that a country must make to finance the agricultural 
goods procured in world markets.  This percentage, which shows large variation across 
countries, is a better indicator of trade vulnerability than the ratio of food imports to 
exports that has been utilized in the WTO to define the Net Food Importing Developing 
Countries (see Diaz-Bonilla, Thomas, Robinson, and Cattaneo, 2000).  At the same time 
this trade indicator has to be considered in relation to the expansion of domestic 
consumption, because the results in terms of overall food security are very different if, for 
instance, a decline in the ratio is due to import and domestic consumption compression, 
or is related to increased domestic production that allows an expansion in consumption 
and declines in imports.  The simulations show that agricultural trade liberalization by 
industrialized countries reduces the ratio of agricultural imports to total exports in most 
developing countries and regions (33 over 40), because of a decline in agricultural 
imports, an increase in overall exports, or a combination of both.  Results with or without 
technological change do not vary much.  If all countries liberalize agriculture, then the   52 
ratio increases in almost all developing countries and regions, with changes mostly in the 
range of 1-3 percentage points.
25 
About 10 countries or regions show changes smaller than 1 percentage point, but 
3 countries (Bangladesh, Peru, Morocco) have increases in the range of 3-4 percentage 
points.  It must be remembered that these simulations only reflect changes in agricultural 
policies.  The current Doha Round includes also negotiations on industry and services 
which may lead to larger exports in other goods, reducing the percentage value of food 
imports with respect to total exports.  In fact, over the last four decades this percentage 
for all developing countries fell from about 20% at the beginning of the 1960s to about 5-
6% at the end of the 1990s (see Diaz Bonilla Diaz-Bonilla, Thomas, Robinson, and 
Cattaneo, 2000). 
 
                                                 
25  For example Turkey had a percentage of  agricultural imports over total exports of  9.4% in the base that 
increases to 10.9% with full liberalization, for an increase of 1.5 percentage points.    53 
Table 20—Agricultural Imports by Developing Countries (as percentage of total 
exports)  
                                  Liberalization in: 




      plus  TFP  plus  TFP   plus 
TFP 
 plus  TFP   plus  TFP 
China 4.5  4.3  4.3  4.5 4.5  4.5  4.5  4.3  4.3  6.8  6.8 
Indonesia 7.4  7.3  7.3  7.4 7.4  7.4  7.4  7.3  7.3  8.4  8.4 
Malaysia 4.1  4.2  4.2  4.2 4.2  4.2  4.2  4.2  4.2  5.1  5.0 
Philippines 7.9  8.1  8.1  7.8 7.8  7.9  7.9  8.0  8.0  10.1  10.1 
Thailand 4.5  4.6  4.6  4.5 4.5  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.7  5.8  5.8 
Vietnam 5.9  5.8  5.8  5.8 5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  6.5  6.5 
Bangladesh 20.4  19.9  19.9  20.1 20.1  20.3  20.3  19.4  19.4  24.2  24.2 
India 4.8  4.8  4.7  4.7 4.7  4.7  4.7  4.6  4.6  7.0  6.9 
Sri Lanka  12.1  12.3  12.3  12.2 12.2  12.2  12.2  12.4  12.4  14.9  14.9 
Other South Asia  19.2  18.6  18.5  19.1 19.1  19.1  19.1  18.3  18.3  21.7  21.7 
Mexico 5.9  5.7  5.7  5.9 5.9  5.9  5.9  5.6  5.6  6.9  6.9 
Central America and 
Caribbean 
13.6 13.2  13.1  13.4 13.4  13.7  13.7  13.0  12.9  16.0  15.9 
Colombia 9.5  9.3  9.3  9.5 9.5  9.5  9.5  9.3  9.2  11.6  11.5 
Peru   14.0  13.6  13.6 14.0 13.9 14.1  14.1 13.6  13.5  17.1  17.0 
Venezuela 6.4  6.2  6.2  6.3 6.3  6.4  6.4  6.1  6.1  7.7  7.7 
Rest of Andean Pact  10.4  10.1  10.1  10.4 10.4  10.4  10.4  10.1  10.0  12.5  12.4 
Argentina 5.3  5.1  5.1  5.3 5.2  5.3  5.3  5.1  5.0  6.3  6.1 
Brazil 9.8  9.5  9.5  9.5 9.5  9.8  9.8  9.3  9.2  11.3  11.2 
Chile 6.5  6.4  6.4  6.4 6.4  6.5  6.5  6.3  6.3  7.4  7.4 
Uruguay 11.4  11.4  11.3  11.3 11.3  11.4  11.4  11.3  11.2  13.8  13.7 
Rest of South America  19.7  19.5  19.5  19.2 19.2  19.7  19.7  19.1  19.0  21.7  21.6 
Hungary 4.2  4.2  4.2  4.5 4.5  4.2  4.2  4.5  4.5  5.6  5.6 
Poland 10.4  10.3  10.3  10.2 10.2  10.4  10.4  10.2  10.2  12.8  12.8 
Rest Central European 
Assoc. 
6.6 6.6  6.6  6.4 6.4  6.6  6.6  6.4  6.4  8.1  8.1 
Former Soviet Union  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.1 15.1  15.4  15.4  15.1  15.1  17.2  17.2 
Turkey 9.4  9.2  9.2  9.1 9.1  9.4  9.4  8.9  8.9  10.9  10.9 
Middle East  7.9  7.8  7.8  7.6 7.6  7.9  7.9  7.4  7.4  9.8  9.8 
Morocco   12.7  12.3  12.3 11.9 11.9 12.7  12.7 11.5  11.5  16.2  16.2 
Rest of North Africa  17.0  16.5  16.5  16.2 16.3 17.0  17.0  15.6  15.6  18.3  18.3 
Botswana 8.0  8.0  8.0  8.1 8.1 8.0  8.0  8.1  8.1  8.5  8.5 
South Africa and Rest 
of SACU 
4.8 4.7  4.7  4.7 4.7 4.8  4.8  4.6  4.6  5.1  5.2 
Malawi 2.1  2.1  2.1  2.0 2.0 2.1  2.1  2.0  2.0  2.6  2.5 
Mozambique 23.0  22.5  22.3  22.5 22.5 22.9  22.9  22.2  21.9  22.9  22.7 
Tanzania 21.2  20.9  20.8  20.6 20.6 21.2  21.2  20.3  20.1  24.0  23.7 
Zambia 2.1  2.1  2.1  2.0 2.0 2.1  2.1  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.1 
Zimbabwe 6.6  6.6  6.6  6.5 6.5 6.6  6.6  6.4  6.4  7.8  7.6 
Other Southern Africa  8.7  8.7  8.7  8.9 8.9 8.7  8.7  8.9  8.9  10.1  10.0 
Uganda 6.9  6.7  6.7  6.5 6.4 6.9  6.9  6.3  6.2  7.3  7.2 
Rest of SubSaharan  9.4  9.2  9.2  8.8 8.8 9.4  9.4  8.6  8.6  10.0  10.0 
Rest of the World  14.8  14.7  14.7  14.2 14.2 14.8  14.8  14.1  14.1  16.2  16.2   54 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has tried to identify the separate and overall impacts of agricultural 
policies of industrialized countries on developing countries, and to compare those results 
with liberalization of agricultural policies in developing countries.  The model 
incorporates a slight effect of trade on productivity and has a specification in labor 
markets that, different from most of the simulation with general equilibrium and 
multimarket models, does not assume full employment in developing countries.  General 
equilibrium models with full employment can only expand agricultural production by 
taking labor from non-agricultural activities, which is a constraint on the welfare effects 
projected in models with that specification.  Any positive multiplier effects on the rest of 
the economy of an expanded agricultural sector are assumed away under full employment 
specifications.
26 In this model, on the other hand, improved world prices from overall 
agricultural liberalization lead to larger production in agricultural activities utilizing the 
rural unemployed.  Expanded agricultural incomes then lead to increased demand for 
non-agricultural activities, and to more employment and production there, with further 
rounds of expansionary effects for the economy as a whole.     
Those multiplier effects are limited, however, because,  as indicated, the 
simulations presented here have maintained capital and land at baseline values, and the 
productivity effects are modest.  Other analyses, with stronger dynamic effects linked to 
capital accumulation and technology diffusion, project larger increases in welfare for all 
developing countries resulting from liberalization in industrialized countries 
                                                 
26 As mentioned already, multimarket models, as partial equilibrium approaches, do not consider the 
possible multiplier effects and links to the rest of the economy.   55 
(USDA/ERS, 2001, World Bank, 2001).  It has also been mentioned that Africa, and in 
part LAC, seem to have a margin for agricultural expansion on new land that, with better 
world agricultural prices, those countries may find profitable to utilize. By maintaining 
land fixed in the model, this potential increase in production and employment from 
changes in current agricultural policies has not been factored in.  Therefore, current 
policies by industrialized countries may have larger negative effect than the ones 
simulated here if the dynamic effects on capital accumulation and land expansion are 
considered.   
Other aspect that may tend to underestimate the negative impact of current 
policies of industrialized countries relates to the use of a recent baseline year, and 1997 in 
particular.  In this year protection and subsidization in industrialized countries (as 
measured by the NACs) were the lowest in the last decade.  In particular they do not 
capture the full impact of cotton subsidies, particularly in the US, and the 2002 US Farm 
Bill is not included in the database.  Simulations with updated values may indeed show 
that the negative impacts of industrialized policies on developing countries is larger.   
A related point is that many of the current simulations (including the one 
presented) use a relatively recent benchmark year. Whatever impact the policies of 
industrialized countries may have had over the years on the agriculture and economy of 
developing countries, it has been already embedded in that base year.
27  Depressed world 
prices of many food products related to agricultural protectionism and subsidies in 
industrialized countries may have contributed to some developing countries becoming net 
                                                 
27 Other analyses based on a historical perspective suggested important negative effects over time in several 
developing countries for production and employment linked to agroindustrial products such as meat, sugar, 
cotton and canned tomatoes, as a result of industrialized countries' agricultural policies (OXFAM, 1987 and 
2002; Eurostep, 1999).   56 
food importers of those products, pushing them into a more extreme specialization in 
tropical products than would have been the case under a different set of prices.  Given 
that distorted starting position, the short-term, static impact of liberalization may have a 
negative terms of trade effect on some developing countries, if, for instance, they have 
access to high-priced industrialized countries’ markets for some products (say sugar) and 
buy cheap subsidized temperate products (say wheat) from developed countries.   
To the extent that past effects from industrialized countries’ policies are taken as 
bygones embedded in the current structure of developing countries, and that, as discussed  
above, the possible future changes in that structure are constrained by assuming full 
employment and limiting additional investments and productivity effects, then those 
simulations may well be underestimating the negative effects on developing countries 
from maintaining current agricultural policies in industrialized countries.
28  
Finally another caveat relates to trade preferences: this issue, in opposition to 
those discussed so far, may lead to the underestimation of the costs for some developing 
countries of agricultural liberalization in industrialized countries.  While GTAP database 
5 includes the volume of trade flows which presumably incorporate the quantity of the 
preferences, there is no separate treatment of preferential tariffs for developing countries 
in industrialized countries. The relevance of this issue varies by products, depending on 
the structure of trade of each developing country.  Some countries, even losing access to 
a high priced market for a (usually smaller) percentage of their production may gain more 
                                                 
28 The more general issue of why general equilibrium models seem to underestimate the growth and trade 
effects of trade agreements is discussed in Robinson and Thierfelder, 1999.   57 
from better world prices for what typically is the larger percentage of their exports. But 
for others, the rents accruing from preferential access may be important.
 29 
Keeping the caveats in mind, the results in this paper, only by relaxing the full 
employment assumption and by allowing some small productivity effects,  show a more 
uniformly positive effect on developing countries of agricultural trade liberalization in 
industrialized countries: welfare and total GDP expand for most of the developing 
countries and regions considered, with the main exceptions of some countries in North 
Africa and the Middle East, regions that have a predominance of oil producers and a 
relatively more limited natural resource base for agricultural production.  Also 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka appear to have some welfare and GDP losses,
30 and the group 
of Other Southern Africa show a small GDP decline, in an scenario of agricultural trade 
liberalization only by industrialized countries.  On the other hand, the main winners, in 
percentage terms over baseline values of welfare and GDP, appear to be smaller countries 
in South and Central America, and several in SSA.  When all countries liberalize only the 
region Other North Africa shows a small negative sign in welfare, while total GDP 
increases for all developing countries and regions.  The difference between changes in 
real GDP and welfare in some of these countries results, of course, from the fact that the 
expansion in GDP does not compensate the negative terms of trade effects on 
consumption.  
Overall about 40-50% of the improvements in welfare in developing countries 
and regions result from the elimination of protection and subsidies in industrialized 
                                                 
29 For instance, in the case of sugar, ABARE 2000, estimates that although overall benefits for developing 
countries of liberalizing sugar markets are significant, about a third of the countries considered may suffer 
losses.  
30 0.2% or 2/100 of 1%.   58 
countries, compared to other simulations where less than a quarter comes from policy 
changes in rich countries (see, for instance, World Bank, 2001; Tokarick,2003).   These 
results do not contradict the strategy of most developing countries of keeping pressure on 
industrialized countries to liberalize their agriculture, but at the same time (and in line of 
most of the literature) suggest important gains from more market-oriented policies in 
developing countries themselves.       
The outcomes in terms of welfare and GDP refer to the entire economy.  Those 
that consider that agriculture is in itself very important in developing countries (because 
of poverty, food security and related problems) and/or do not believe that the full 
dynamic effects on the rest of the economy of a vibrant agricultural sector are fully 
captured through these models, would rather focus on agricultural and agroindustrial 
value added.   
The behavior of this variable suggests that the policies of industrialized countries 
consistently displace agricultural production (primary and processed) in developing 
countries.  While in absolute values the displacement effects are bigger in countries like 
China, Brazil, Thailand, Argentina, and India (see Diao, Diaz-Bonilla and Robinson, 
2003), in percentage terms they seem more important, again, for smaller countries in 
South and Central America, in SSA, and for some Asian countries such as Vietnam.  As 
indicated, the notion of supporting agriculture in industrialized countries on account of 
multifuncional effects cannot avoid facing the issue that those same policies are reducing 
production, and the presumed multifunctional effects, in developing countries.   
The uniform expansion of the agricultural and agroindustrial sectors in developing 
countries when industrial countries liberalize their agricultural policies, declines   59 
somewhat when also developing countries reduce protection.  But, in this last scenario, 
only in Middle East the value of primary and processed agriculture drops below the 
baseline (even if productivity effects are allowed), although as shown before, overall 
GDP and welfare would expand under this scenario.  This illustrates the fact that policies 
that artificially expand the agricultural sector may reduce overall GDP and welfare.  
These results also suggest that the majority of developing countries share a 
common interest in calling for a more open EU agricultural market, while more open US 
and Japanese markets are in the interest of a smaller group of countries located in LAC 
and Asia.  It appears that the policies of the EU have the larger negative effect on 
welfare, total GDP, and agricultural value added in developing countries, affecting (in 
percentage terms) mainly smaller countries of Central and South America and  countries 
in SSA.  In absolute values the main negative effects occur in LAC.  Current US policies 
affect negatively LAC and SSA, but their elimination may also lead to decreases in 
welfare in some countries in Asia and in the North Africa and Middles East area (as is 
also the case with Europe’s policies), with the caveats noted regarding the lower levels of 
support in the baseline year, especially for cotton.  Changes in Japan’s policies will have 
beneficial effects mainly in Asia, with mostly small positive or neutral effects in the rest 
of developing countries. 
Because of the complexities of agricultural trade, the overall impact of 
liberalization on specific countries would vary.  Still, and even without allowing for all 
possible dynamic benefits resulting from capital accumulation, land expansion, and 
stronger technological effects, the results suggest that if industrialized countries were to 
substantially reduce their protection and subsidies, most Third World farmers would   60 
produce more food and agricultural goods domestically, leading to expanded incomes not 
only in the agricultural sector but in the rest of the economy as well.      
Higher prices resulting from agricultural liberalization in industrialized countries 
could still hurt some groups, especially poor urban consumers. Yet better farm incomes 
and related employment benefits to rural communities from higher prices of traditional 
crops, greater access to global markets for other products, such as fruits, vegetables and 
sugar, and the multiplier effects on employment and income for the rest of the economy 
resulting from a more vibrant agricultural sector, would likely more than compensate 
these vulnerable populations, thereby not harming overall food security.  It is nonetheless 
important to expand the efforts for more disaggregated policy analysis of the different 
scenarios of agricultural liberalization (see Robillard, Bourguignon, and Robinson, 2001; 
Hertel, Preckel, and Reimer, 2001, S. Morley and C. Diaz-Bonilla, 2003; and Brooks, 
2003).  
In any case, countries must ensure that poor and vulnerable populations are 
compensated in the case of adverse effects, and that food security is not compromised by 
agricultural liberalization, or other policy changes.  Fortunately, poverty-focused 
assistance is more effective – because it is more easily targeted – in urban communities, 
where poor consumers most likely would be harmed by higher food prices. International 
food aid can help in this regard, provided it stops being pro-cyclical (i.e. abundant when 
there is ample supply of food and prices are low, and scarce when the opposite occurs 
and food aid would be more needed) and it is managed in a way that does not displace 
domestic production in the recipient countries. In addition, some of the food importing 
developing countries with high food import tariffs should consider reducing them   61 
progressively to cushion the impact of higher world prices on poor consumers. After all, 
high tariffs on imported food operate as a regressive tax on poor consumers. At the same 
time, all developing countries, particularly the poorest, should expand investments in 
rural development, poverty alleviation and health and nutrition. For this to happen 
additional funding from international institutions and bilateral donors will be needed, as 
well as firm political commitment and good governance in the countries involved.   62 
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ANNEX 1—COUNTRIES 
US (with Canada), EU (with EFTA
31), Japan (with Korea), Australia/New Zealand, and 
Other Developed.
 32 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh, India, Sri 
Lanka, Other South Asia.
33  
Mexico, Central America and Caribbean
34, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of Andean 
Pact
35, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Rest of South America
36.  
Hungary, Poland, Rest of Central European Associates
37, Former Soviet Union.
38  
Turkey, Middle East
39, Morocco, Rest of North Africa.
40  
Botswana, South Africa and Rest of SACU
41, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Other Southern Africa
42, Uganda, Rest of Sub-Saharan
43.  
Rest of the World
44.
                                                 
31 Switzerland, Iceland, Leichtenstein, Norway. 
32 Other Developed is a residual mostly from Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore).  
33 Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 
34 Anguila, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belice, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haití, Honduras, Jamaica, Netherlands 
Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Virgin Islands (British) 
35 Bolivia, Ecuador. 
36 Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname. 
37 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
38Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of 
Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
39 Middle East is also an aggregate region in GTAP encompassing Bahrain, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen.   
40 Rest of North Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.  
41 Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland. 
42 Angola and Mauritius 
43 Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mayotte, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and Zaire. 
44 Rest of the World includes Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Bermuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, 
Cambodia, Croatia, Cyprus, Faroe Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gibraltar, Greenland, Guadeloupe, 
Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Macau, Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Federated States of, Monaco, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Caledonia, 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Papua New Guinea, San Marino, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Yugoslavia.   68
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